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Introduction 
A release some years ago by the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), puts the cost of 
corruption in Nigeria since 1960 at a staggering figure of 220 billion pounds. This 
probably explains the slow pace of development as the adverse effect of corruption on 
national development is phenomenal. This chapter thus examines the implication of 
corruption for governance in Nigeria since independence. It argues that corrupt and other 
related acts would inevitably thwart democratic governance, pollute the political space 
and create a spatial economy and lead to a “massification” of the poor. The chapter 
hinges its argument on the fact that corruption throws spanners in the wheels of national 
development and hinges its argument on the fact that governance of Nigeria has suffered 
lack of accountability, transparency and honesty for too long. It is recommended that 
anti-corruption agencies should rather be controlled and answerable to the judiciary, be 
made up of persons with records of integrity, and be led by a judge with a track record of 
forthrightness and fearlessness.  
 
Concept of Corruption 
Broadly speaking, corruption is a term used to describe acts that are considered immoral, 
such as fraud, graft, bribery, stealing, perjury, lying, dishonesty, indiscipline, and debased 
act like sexual immorality or perversion. Corrupt acts also include economic and 
financial crimes, nepotism, favoritism or discrimination and partiality in decision-making 
or allocation of values. Corruption thus represents degeneration from the normal, that is, 
an anti-social behavior (Okojie and Momoh, 2005:1). By inference therefore, corruption 
goes beyond the narrow definition of the World Bank as the use of public office for 
private gain (Hulter and Shah, 2000).  
 
Our operational definition of corruption will however be flowing from the United Nations 
guideline in its ‘Manual on Anti-Corruption Policy III’, which distinguishes two 
important corruption typologies namely, grand and petty corruption. Grand corruption 
represents such anti-state acts as looting, 419 scam, money laundering and operation of 
illegal foreign bank vaults by public officers and private individuals. Such other acts as 
immorality, dishonesty, perjury, though related to grand corruption, will be considered as 
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petty corruption. Grand corruption is thus another term for public corruption; while petty 
corruption may refer to private corruption. However, both are not mutually exclusive as 
aspects of one can be gleaned from the other. 
 
In their study, Okojie and Momoh (2005:2) define grand corruption as an act which is 
widespread and systematic in nature and damaging to the local economy. To commit 
grand corruption is to commit economic crime and those who commit it are being 
regarded as ‘economic criminals’.  
 
However, there is also the phenomenon of political corruption that further explicates the 
term, grand corruption. Political or grand corruption has brought much social decadence 
upon the Nigerian State, carrying along with it, such rotten baggage as godfatherism, 
influence-peddling, rigging of elections, manipulation of and buying of votes, 
manipulative political financing, embezzlement in office, and fraud. Aiyede (2006) 
defines political corruption as the abuse of public or governmental power for illegitimate 
private advantage. For Lipset and Lenz (2000:112), political corruption is an effort to 
secure wealth or power through illegal means for private benefit.  
 
The Nigerian anti-corruption law has identified as corrupt practices, the use of pecuniary 
advantage, insincerity in advice with a view to gaining advantage, less than a full day’s 
work for a full day’s pay, tardiness and laziness towards public office or tasks, failure to 
report cases of inducement to the anti-corruption bodies, among others (Akanbi, 2004; 
Aiyede, 2006: 39).  For our purposes therefore, in view of the fact that we are examining 
the Nigerian public life, grand corruption, that is the use of public office for private 
advantages, will be our framework.   
 
Manifestations of Corruption 
Private Corruption 
By private corruption, we mean people outside government, private individuals engaging 
in unethical acts. These could be individuals outside institutions who commit acts of 
immorality (perversion, show of dementia, and acts of fraud or scamming). The other 
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group of people is persons in the organized private sector who may loot or carry out other 
acts of fraud in their companies or who colludes with those in government to perpetrate 
sharp financial practices. 
 
Private corruption has manifested in Nigeria as everyday bribery to obtain a desired 
objective, breaking of traffic laws, piracy, plagiarism, alteration of school grades, illegal 
inflation of petroleum pump prices by dealers, robbery, sexual gratification for higher 
grades or promotion, et cetera. 
 
Public Corruption 
This is the familiar corruption that takes place in government or by government officials 
and their accomplices in the private sector. Another name for public corruption is official, 
grand or institutional corruption. This is the kind of corruption involving public office 
holders. In this case, persons in position of authority exploit the position to take from the 
commonwealth. Let us briefly look at the manifestations of public corruption. 
 
i. Political corruption: This is the kind of corruption that obtains in the three arms of 
government in a democratic rule, namely, executive, legislative and judiciary. 
Corruption at this level is the highest because it involves state fund. The issues 
of personal and primordial attachments in appointment, award of contracts; as 
well inflation of contract monies, embezzlement of funds, and 
misappropriation of fund are critical examples of public corruption in the 
executive. The legislature in Nigeria has in recent times been in the news for 
high profile bribery scandals (the Hembe-Oteh bribe scandal and the Farouk 
Lawan-Femi Otedola bribery allegations) in which the chairmen of the House 
of Representatives probe panels were indicted by the persons they were 
probing for demanding and collecting bribes from the suspects. The judiciary 
becomes vulnerable when it looks away from an obvious case of crime, tries 
to downplay the veracity of a crime, or commits travesty of justice for a 
particular political interest. The Federal Court of Appeal has been in a state of 
crisis for sometime leading to the suspension of its president on alleged 
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complicity in election cases involving some western states which the president 
was said to have served the interest of a political party (Ketefe, 2012).  
 
ii. Bureaucratic corruption: Corruption here is still at the level of government. It 
involves the technocrats and civil as well as public servants who implement 
government policies. These include the leadership and personnel in ministries, 
departments and agencies (MDAs). The corruption at this level is the worst as 
the allocation, release and use of money is executed by these government 
offices. The staff are the ones that propose and submit financial needs of the 
units or projects and they are the ones that transfer and effect payment. 
Corruption becomes rife at this point. We have had cases of heads of 
ministries and parastatals busted and arraigned before competent courts and 
tribunals on charges of high profile stealing and fraud. Bureaucratic 
corruption also manifests in favouritism and nepotism in appointment, 
promotion and reward systems in public offices. Some persons get rapid 
promotion and rewards on the basis of family, friendship, ethnic or religious 
affiliations to the boss; while some never get promotion because of such 
frivolous considerations.  
 
iii. Military corruption: This was obtainable in Nigeria during military dictatorship. 
Ironically, the military was an institution that saw itself as a corrective regime 
in the face of bad leadership and festering corruption. That was the original 
intention of the army when they struck in January 1966. But we also know 
that the counter-coup of July was an ethnic-motivated coup meant to avenge 
the assassination of some persons of northern extraction in the first coup. With 
this mentality, professionalism that formed the fulcrum of the “corrective” 
notion of the institution began to fade out as corruption gradually crept in. By 
1971, the military had become debased as all sorts of allegations were raised 
against General Gown’s military ministers and state governors. It got worse 
with the Babangida and Abacha regimes which came under the spotlight as 
the two most corrupt leaderships in the country (TI, 2004). 
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iv. Other forms of institutional corruption: The other forms of institutional corruption 
include that in the media and entertainment industries and even in the labour 
movement. The media is particularly known for the graft or ‘brown envelope” 
syndrome in which news reports are only publishable when certain individuals 
or groups in the story pay their way; or when an image polishing is done for 
those who can pay the reporter for it; or negative stories are stepped down 
when money has been paid to destroy such story. In the entertainment 
industry, persons for musical or movie auditions may have to “sort” or “settle” 
with money or sexual gratification to be given roles in films even when they 
are good or very bad. Labour groups are sometimes compromised by 
government not to embark on industrial action or to betray the cause of the 
movement by “sorting” labour leaders through the fattening of their accounts.  
 
Nigeria’s Corruption Profile 
Corruption has been identified as a major challenge to national development in Nigeria 
(Seteolu, 2004). For the past fifty years or so, corruption has manifested in bribery, graft, 
treasury looting, subsidy and pension theft, money laundering, advance fee fraud, general 
indiscipline, favouritism and nepotism. The deep-seated nature of corruption and its 
drawbacks have earned Nigeria all manner of rankings by the eagle-eyed and whistle-
blowing global corruption monitoring agency, Transparency International (TI), which 
once placed Nigeria as the fifth most corrupt nation among over 100 countries of the 
world sampled (T1, 2005). The corruption culture became so etched in the social life that 
certain catchphrases have entered the social lexicon of the country. These include 
“sorting” (2005-date), “kleptocracy” (1990s-date), “settlementocracy” (1980s to 1990s) 
and “contractocracy” (1960s to1980s). 
 
The embarrassing rate of corruption has continually brought Nigeria into global spotlight 
and made it feature in the news for the wrong reasons. This has led to the attempts by 
successive administrations to fight public and private corruption. Notable among these 
attempts have been Ethical Revolution by the Shagari administration, War Against 
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Indiscipline (WAI) by the Buhari-Idiagbon regime in the 1980s, War Against Indiscipline 
and Corruption (WAIC) by the Abacha regime in the 1990s; and the recent Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act of 2000, which berthed the ICPC (ICPC, 
2006); as well as the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission set up in 2002 by the 
Olusegun Obasanjo administration to tackle economic and financial crimes, including 
advance fee fraud (419), overt looting of public treasury, and money laundering (EFCC, 
2002). 
 
Pre-Colonial Era 
Corruption in Nigeria has sometimes been traced to the pre-colonial era, when the 
forerunners to colonial masters created Afro-European conversations that were premised 
on falsetto. It has been argued by some scholars such as Davidson (1960), Ikime (1985) 
and Anene and Brown (1966) that the colonialists established an empire on the 
foundation of scam or fraud. Their “carrot and stick” approach was itself manipulative 
and deceptive. It was not different from offering grafts in exchange for favours, which 
falls within our conceptual framework of corruption. The acquisition and establishment 
of colonies were fraudulent and questionable. In some places, they had offered 
“protection”, sealed in questionable “protectorate treaties” that turned out to be outright 
scamming of local chiefs to let off their kingdoms without knowing it. King Jaja of 
Opobo had questioned the meaning of “protectorate”, for which he was dethroned and 
banished (Alagoa, 1980). King Shaka of the Zulu kingdom had queried the real intentions 
of the European offer of military alliance and “protectorate” over the Natal Province, for 
which his kingdom was subsequently infiltrated with traitors even from Shaka’s royal 
family, who eventually secured the alliance of the Europeans to tear the great Zulu 
kingdom apart (Golightly, 2011). 
 
Historical records show that Africans once lived together and had their traditional conflict 
and peace times which further bound them. But with the coming of the Europeans shortly 
after the Berlin settlement of colonial interest in 1885, the approach the Europeans came 
with were not far from corrupt practices as we have defined it. For instance, the 
missionaries had brought the message of sublimity and meekness through the teachings 
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of the scriptural beatitudes but which the colonial masters seemed to have manipulated to 
make “zombies” of the subjects, apparently preparatory to a fraudulent change of land 
and state ownership.  
 
In some cases, Europeans resorted to playing Africans against one another. In the Niger 
Delta area, the Dappa Pepple Ijaw kingdom was pulled down by a fraudulent siding with 
Anne Pepple with men and material to prosecute an insurgency that would topple Dappa, 
a recalcitrant leader who despised European encroachment. The Efiks were played 
against the Ibibios just for the purpose of winning the Efiks to gain control of the coastal 
trade (Alagoa, 1980).  
 
Colonial Era 
During colonialism, the divide and rule and carrot and stick systems did not change. It 
was this pattern of public corruption that the colonial masters directly bequeathed to the 
political class. While the southwest sought early decolonization and the north preferred a 
much later date, it was the north that power was eventually handed over to. The northern 
political class thus began to see power as their birthright and would adopt the strategy of 
divide and rule like their European protégés at independence.  
 
A process of recycling northern elements in power, populating the political system (and 
government) with northern elements and empowering the younger political class with 
plum and strategic positions in government, sharing huge contracts among the elite for 
financial empowerment, using the military to seize power and consolidate the northern 
hold on to power, as well as manipulating census figures to reflect a demographic 
superiority of the north over the south, would follow. The raising of Warrant Chiefs in 
eastern Nigeria during colonial rule was a probable attempt at deepening divisions in the 
Igbo society, while the extension of the tax policy to include women paying tax was 
considered a rip-off. Also, the use of Warrant Chiefs, use of persons from the Osu Caste 
system as chiefs and tax collectors and the taxing of women were alien to traditional 
Igboland. But the deliberate introduction of this was considered by the people at the time 
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as a means to defraud them and corrupt the system for self interest (Columbia 
Encyclopedia, 2012). 
 
Post-Colonial Era  
The corruption profile during military and civilian rule was not different. Characteristics 
of corruption remain “kleptocracy” (stealing in high government places with or without 
the connivance of individuals in the private sector); “contractocracy” (a recurring act of 
distributing bloated capital projects construction monies among friends and family 
members; such contracts may remain undone and as such constitute white elephants); 
“settlementocracy” (a chop-I-chop government where national wealth goes round a 
personnel in government and their cronies; they can also buy off people considered 
potential or real opposition); and of course the regular money laundering, drug peddling, 
and embezzlement of public fund.  
 
Indeed the history of Nigeria from 1960 has been the accounts of misappropriation of 
funds, embezzlement or looting of treasury, prebendalism and “settlements” through 
grafts and contracts (Awoshakin, 2006). One of the reasons why the administration of Sir 
Abubakar Tafawa Balewa was overthrown by the military in 1966 was alleged crass 
materialism among his ministers and “corruption in high places” (Nzeogwu, 1966). 
According to Nzeogwu, the “enemies” were those “corrupt ministers, VIPs… in high 
places… the ten percenters (from fat contracts)…who have turned development back by 
several years…and who have made Nigeria big for nothing in international circles” 
(paraphrased) (cited in Obasanjo, 1987). 
 
After the civil war in 1970, the three “Rs” (Rehabilitation, Reconciliation and 
Reconstruction) were massively embarked upon by the Gowon regime with the huge oil 
revenue that had characterized the war years. The oil fortunes soon became a minus as it 
prompted the arbitrary and careless Udoji Salary Awards that over-monetized the 
economy, discouraged rural farming and constructed spatial inflation. The resultant 
situation was the over-prizing of money ahead of social values, which caused infidelity of 
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market forces, embezzlement for increased financial capacity and gratifications (Adele, 
1998). 
 
The oil boom and windfall predated the era of jumbo and “white elephant” projects and 
inflated contract awards. Subsequently, the “Rs” era witnessed declining national 
morality with Gowon’s Supreme Military Council members accused of unprecedented 
personal aggrandizement and arbitrary awards of jumbo project contracts to friends, 
relations and foreign partners (Diamond, 1998). 
 
The military regime of Murtala Mohammed and Olusegun Obasanjo benefited from a 
tremendous influx of oil money that increased 350% between 1973 and 1974, when oil 
prices skyrocketed, to 1979, when the military stepped down. Increased revenues 
permitted massive spending that, incidentally, was poorly planned and concentrated in 
urban areas. The oil boom was marred by a minor recession in 1978-79, but revenues 
rebounded until mid-1981.The increase in revenues made possible a rapid rise in income, 
especially for the urban middle class. There was a corresponding inflation, particularly in 
the price of food, as rural dwellers, who were the major producers of food, had begun to 
move to the urban centres in search of white collar jobs to benefit in the oil money (Eker, 
1999). The urban centres soon became glutted and places like Lagos began to produce 
slums, shabby environs and criminally minded unemployed youth (Folarin, 2006). 
 
The sudden wealth arising from oil, which dominated Nigeria’s exports, encouraged 
greed, corruption and berthed the new trend among the political and military class to seek 
power by all means because of the opulence occurring from it. About #2.8 billion of oil 
revenue was allegedly declared missing from the state affairs in 1978 as reckless 
spending characterized an unaccountable governance (Nwankwo, 1999). This prompted 
the Obasanjo Declaration at Jaji in 1977 sign-posting the commencement of the battle 
against the creeping culture of corruption, bribery and indiscipline. 
 
Shagari’s Ethical Revolution was to transform the society in which corruption and 
financial indiscipline had become pandemic. The term “revolution” denoted the gravity 
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of the decadence, which could not be handled by Obasanjo’s Jaji Declaration. The period 
of Ethical Revolution was marked by state officials amassing wealth from public 
parastatals, boards and ministries to stave off as much as possible in an emergent era of 
“oil doom” (that is, a time fortunes on oil revenue had declined considerably) with an 
interface of inflation and deflation. The Shagari administration responded by introducing 
Austerity Measures, a policy that caused severe social and economic hardships that 
encouraged treasury looting, bribery, fraud and social crimes like robbery. It was this era 
that witnessed the phenomenon of arson-after-looting by officials in a bid to offset all 
records that could trace culprits. The Nigerian External Telecommunications (NET) 
buildings, among others, were the early examples of this new dimension of corruption. 
 
War Against Indiscipline (WAI) was a practical approach to corruption and immorality 
pursued in 1984 by Generals Buhari and Idiagbon. Setting up military task forces, the 
“war” ranged from forcing market prices down, raiding illegal and informal “black-
market” sales outlets, arresting and detaining corrupt politicians, sentencing corrupt 
offenders to life imprisonment or death; to compulsory environmental sanitation, 
maintenance of decorum at public places, queuing to board buses, trains, planes, to buy 
stamps at post offices, in making telephone calls, and even fetching water from public 
pipes. 
 
The measures were however considered too high-handed, stifling social life and used as a 
weapon to eliminate political and military opposition. The task forces were also accused 
of excesses, such as raiding to loot markets, assaulting “bloody civilians” and 
intimidating their petty foes or folk alike (Ake, 1987).  
 
General Babangida overthrew the Buhari administration on charges of “high handedness” 
among others. Babangida thereafter relaxed the “war” and rather commenced a social and 
economic reengineering policy, culminating in Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). 
The programme, badly implemented, gave Nigeria away to foreign profiteers who 
collaborated with local capital cliques (including leadership and the economic class) to 
make fortunes through deregulation (privatization and commercialization). Soon the 
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middle class paled into extinction, the gulf between the rich and the poor widened 
significantly, naira lost its value remarkably, and the social situation became unbearable 
for the masses (Osoba, 1993). 
 
Indiscipline intensified in the polity: crime rate escalated; short-cuts to wealth through 
drug peddling, money rituals and reckless aggrandizement took dangerous dimensions; 
and money laundering and advance fee fraud (419) became phenomenal in the country. 
Three of these variants of corruption and indiscipline namely, drug peddling, money 
laundering and advance fee fraud or 419 were not only issues that made Nigeria lose its 
goodwill in the global community, but were also the triumvirate that became associated 
with the country during the Babangida regime of SAP. It was the combination of the 
Babangida and Abacha mismanagement of the regime of corruption in Nigeria that 
galvanized the international standing of the nation in 2000 as one of the most corrupt 
nations. Speculations were made that the two military rulers corruptly enriched 
themselves and so could not have controlled the malaise because they were beneficiaries 
of it. The disappearance of the $12.4 billion Gulf War oil windfall from 1991 to date 
added some credibility to this speculation; while government has confirmed reports in the 
case of Abacha that most of his loots have been recovered (Okojie and Momoh, 2005). 
This has been the story of Nigeria before the intervention of 2000 and 2002. 
 
Theoretical Explanations of Corruption 
While examining the dynamics of corruption in Nigeria, Nwolise, in a lecture in 1992, 
described “dynamics” of corruption as the systematic causation of corruption to its 
phenomenal level. Put differently, dynamics have to do with the scientific explanation of 
the causes corruption among public office holders. 
 
Among the forces, poverty is identified as the most fundamental. In a study of an average 
Nigerian society (Ogbunwezeh, 2005), the fear of or the quest to quit poverty has been 
the driving force behind acts of corruption. Those in high places do not want to return to 
abjection after service. In a similar vein, people seek public office to initiate a change of 
financial state or fortunes. The escalating rate of poverty in the country caused by poorly 
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implemented economic policies, misappropriation of funds, among others, culminate in 
state and mass poverty the fear of which drives people to capitalize on opportunities for 
enrichment. Other acts such as 419, drug peddling and laundering are ‘private’ 
manifestations of the poverty mentality syndrome.  
 
Second, the enormity of social or societal pressures on public office holders or an affluent 
individual imposes a burden that could compel acts of corruption. Merton (1957) notes 
that much pressure is exerted on a public office holder or rich family member by 
members of his nuclear or extended family to assist them in one way or the other. This is 
as a result of the fact that a public office such as Local Government Councilor or Senate 
President or Accounts Manager, or Director-General or Chief Accountant is considered 
as a goldmine and proximity to the ‘national cake’ that should be wisely shared among 
family members, who could either be sent to school, or for whom businesses could be set, 
or rehabilitated, among other pressures. These encourage tendencies toward official and 
political corruption, in the same way individuals considered wealthy may be tempted to 
engage in fraud, money laundering or drug peddling in order not to disappoint his 
kinsmen (Ekeh, 1995).  
 
Third and yet closely related is the ‘social responsibility’ paradigm in the functionalist 
model (Chinnoy, 1967). Naturally, as status changes or increases, social responsibilities 
are bound to increase as more expectations, like pressures and demands, are coming from 
people. An elected House of assembly member is not only expected to “deliver” at his 
ward and local government, but also to “take care” of a growing number of political 
associates, friends, political thugs, concubines or wives, and retinue of personal staff. A 
little inflation of contracts and figures here or there may thus be considered not be out of 
place; or adding ‘419’ to his source of income for the non-public office holder may 
become desirable not to lose his status. 
 
Political instability engenders political corruption. Frequent changes of power threaten 
security of office and by extension source of income. The political class, like their 
military counterparts, is tempted to steal as much many as possible while they last in 
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office, as they are not sure of tenure of office anymore. Even under democratic rule, the 
frequent military-like appointment and dropping of Ministers, directors-general and other 
public office holders tacitly encourage corruption. 
 
Other variables explicating corruption in Nigeria include the lingering impact of SAP, 
economic mismanagement, legacies or examples of past corrupt rulers and individuals, 
lack of accountability and transparency, lack of empirical outcome or tangible evidence 
of punishment of past corruption offenders, flaunting of ill-gotten wealth by individuals 
who seek political power with such means, abundance of sacred cows that walk freely in 
and out of corridors of power, and of course the culture of crass materialism that has no 
bounds of age gender and experience in the Nigerian value system (Azelama, 2002). 
 
Major Corruption Cases in Nigeria  
Among the old inconclusive cases of corruption were the 1956 Foster-Sustton Inquiry 
into the Affairs of the African Continental Bank, 1960 Elias Commission of Inquiry into 
the Administration, Economics and Industrial Relations of the Nigerian Railway 
Corporation, 1965 Report of the Tribunal of Inquiry into the Affairs of the Nigerian Ports 
Authority, 1970 Inquiry into the Apapa Road Project fraud, 1980 Tribunal of Inquiry into 
fraudulent crude oil sales, 1983 Ayo Irekefe Panel on alleged N2.8 billion from NNPC’s 
bank account in the UK, 1983 Tribunal of Inquiry into the Republic Building Fire 
Incident, 1999 Christopher Kolade Commission into the Award of Government 
Contracts, and the Idris Kuta Panel Report on the Award of Contracts by the Senate 
between June 1999 and July 2000 (Okojie and Momoh, 2005:18). 
   
There was the high profile corruption case involving former Vice President Abubakar 
Atiku which led to hot verbal exchange between Obasanjo and Atiku in August and 
September 2006. The former President was openly accusing his Vice President, Atiku of 
gross acts of corruption, including illegal transactions, bribery, fraud and embezzlement 
with the view to enrichment (The Sun, 2006). This showed the leadership’s culpability.  
The Obasanjo-Atiku episode opened a new vista in the corruption situation, showing the 
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extent to which such governmental thievery and irresponsibility had eaten deeply in the 
national fabrics.  
 
There was also the scam of the $214 million National Identity Card project that involved 
the Internal Affairs Ministry and SAGEM. SAGEM had supplied as new, fairly used and 
disused data-capturing machines for the 2002/2003 national identity card project at such a 
prohibitive cost. Yet the Ministry had declared that the machines were new, which 
brought the Minister to the spotlight as it was apparent that there was a collusion between 
SAGEM and the Ministry to defraud the government. The case did not however last long 
as it soon died out. Similarly, there was an allegation by some ministerial nominees in 
2003 that the Senate screening committee demanded N54 million bribe to be given 
clearance. There were also the Abacha loots that were traced to local and international 
banks (Jason, 2005).  
 
There was the case of the arrest and trial of a serving Saki East Local Government 
chairman, Mr. Ogunmola for fraudulent contract awards between 2004 and 2006 (Punch, 
2006). Some government officials in Akwa Ibom, Ekiti, Sokoto, Kano and Ondo states 
were busted for corrupt related offences totalling N227 million. Also, by 2006, there were 
already petitions on stealing, money laundering and fraudulent contract awards against 24 
serving state governors in the federation (ICPC, 2006). 
 
One of the biggest cases of public corruption in Nigeria was that involving a serving 
Inspector-General of Police, Tafa Balogun who was exposed and arrested on multiple 
charges, including using his office to embezzle $128 million dollars. There was also the 
case of a serving Bayelsa State Governor, Diepreye Alamieyesegha who was accused of 
many charges, particularly that of multiple money laundering abroad. He was arrested in 
London and detained, but he jumped bail and escaped to Nigeria from London, only to be 
impeached and arrested by the EFCC for prosecution (ThisDay, 2006) 
 
There has been the recovery of N640 billion and arrest of over 500 people in money 
laundering battle in the last 12 years. There was the case of the busting, arrest and 
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prosecution of a Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN), Ricky Tafa over financial scam and 
demand for the sum of over 200 million dollars as bribe from the Chairman of Obat Oil 
Limited between 2005 and April 2006; findings and charges against former Governor 
Joshua Dariye of Plateau state over multiple cases of money laundering abroad; 
investigation of former Ekiti State Governor, Ayo Fayose, former Abia State Governor 
Orji Uzor Kalu, Otunba Mike Adenuga of Globacom and Conoil, Mohammed Babangida, 
son of the former military President Ibrahim Babangida, former Governor George Akume 
of Benue state (The News, 2006), and in recent times, the trial and conviction of Chief 
Olabode George, the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Nigerian Ports Authority 
for multiple frauds as Board Chairman, and the indictment of former Governors Gbenga 
Daniel and Alao Akala of Ogun and Oyo states respectively. 
 
It was discovered that part of the N1.6 billion ecological fund mismanaged by Plateau 
State Governor, Joshua Dariye was donated to the ruling Peoples Democratic Party 
(Aiyede, 2006: 50). The EFCC also uncovered the N50 million scandals involving a 
Minster of Education, Professor Fabian Osuji in allocation deals with the National 
Assembly and the National Universities Commission (NUC), which eventually led to his 
removal and the illegal sales of government’s landed property. This illegal sale and 
allocation of public estates declared for sale which was investigated found a Minister, 
Mrs. Osomo culpable which led to her removal from office (Anwana, 2006). 
 
On September 27 2006, the EFCC levelled allegations of varied cases of grave acts of 
corruption against 31 serving state governors at the floor of the National Assembly. The 
Commission’s Chairman, Nuhu Ribadu made a case against the governors challenging 
them to waive their immunity so that his agency could be enabled to prosecute them (The 
Guardian, 2006). This allegation, although lampooned and described as baseless, 
constituted the first major confrontation of corruption at the very top in Nigeria.  
 
Weaknesses in the Anti-Corruption Crusade 
The institutional weaknesses of the ICPC, EFCC and the Due Process Commission are 
the first set of brickwalls in Nigeria’s fight against corruption. The intuitions, by their 
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acts of omission and commission, appear to lack complete independence. The ICPC is 
very slow to act and cannot, strictu sensu, prosecute; while the seemingly effective EFCC 
can prosecute but appears incapable of penalizing. The close affinities ICPC and EFCC 
have with the presidency that created them in the first place, have made the two to appear 
like instruments of state coercion and victimization of perceived and real enemies of the 
civilian administration. 
 
The above scenario is made credible by the selective investigations and prosecutions by 
both commissions, particularly in handling cases of corruption involving politicians and 
those in the private sector who condemn federal government policies or opposed to the 
recently aborted third term bid by President Olusegun Obasanjo. Among those who were 
in the Federal government’s white list until they took side in the opposition camp in one 
way or the other, are Tafa Balogun, Fabian Osuji, Alamieyesegha, Joshua Dariye, Bola 
Tinubu, Orji Uzor Kalu, Mike Adenuga and more recently Ibrahim Babangida and 
Abubakar Atiku (The News, 2006). The EFCC and the entire anti-corruption machine 
seem to overlook corrupt cases and corrupt persons and groups until they begin to oppose 
the president on his policies and personal decisions affecting governance (Jason, 2006). 
 
This brings us to the issue of certain ignored or “closed” or “forgotten” cases of alleged 
corruption. For instance, the allegations by Nasir El-Rufai, Minister of the Federal 
Capital Territory (Abuja) that two senators close to Obasanjo, Deputy Senate President 
Ibrahim Mantu and Senate Majority leader, Jonathan Zwingina asked him for a bribe of 
N54 million to secure approval for appointment (Dike, 2005) appear consigned in the 
waste bin of history. Again, the whereabouts of recovered Abacha loots declared by the 
Presidency since 1999-2000 are not known nor can what it has been used for be 
ascertained. Also, the $12.4b Gulf War oil windfall made under General Ibrahim 
Babangida’s regime, which cannot be traced to date, is an obvious case of embezzlement 
that neither the EFCC nor ICPC has investigated or shown any willingness to take up. 
Moreover, there are also the copious cases of jumbo contracts, “white elephant” and 
abandoned projects between 1976 and 1983 that are no longer mentioned.  
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The overt politicization of the anti-corruption crusade has made the fight against 
corruption a means to witch-hunt people the presidency may not want to succeed it. The 
Abubakar Atiku case is apposite to locate within this frame of argument. Until Vice 
President Atiku made it apparent that he would like to succeed Obasanjo and demanded 
the latter’s exit in 2007, the two of them were trusted political allies. From 2005 however, 
Atiku vehemently opposed President Obasanjo’s third term bid which he considered as an 
obstacle to his ambition. Shortly, the relationship between the two collapsed and soon 
after, EFCC and president Obasanjo himself, laid charges of corruption against Atiku 
(The News: 20). This development, like many others in which “anti-Obasanjo” politicians 
(Independent, 2006) are involved, have made observers to call ICPC and EFCC 
government’s bulldogs against political enemies (Makarfi, 2006). 
 
The victims of the political witch-hunt are themselves culpable, which explains their 
successful investigation and removal like Balogun, Osuji, Alamieyesegha, Osomo, etc; 
but these are also many allegations and cases not looked into as earlier mentioned, 
because such cases involve those supportive of the administration. (ThisDay, 2006).  
 
There are also constitutional constraints. First, the number of the convicted by the courts 
is quite small in comparison to the allegations. Both the ICPC and EFCC have been tinted 
that they have prima facie evidence of wrong-doing against a majority of state governors, 
but have been unable to prosecute them because of restraining legal frameworks. The 
EFCC claims that the state governors, altogether, hold asserts worth $175 billion in 
foreign accounts. Under the current law, serving governors cannot be the subject of 
criminal action until they cease to hold public office (George, 2000; Newsweek, 2005). 
 
According to the 1999 Federal Constitution, immunity is conferred on 74 public office 
holders, including the President, Vice-President, 36 state governors, and 36 deputy 
governors, who can neither have criminal proceedings instituted against them or be 
arrested or imprisoned while in office. These provisions have been blamed for hindering 
anti-corruption because it is mainly top public office holders that commit heinous 
economic and financial crimes who yet hide under immunity throughout their tenure 
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spanning four years or eight years if they get a second term. For instance, Nigeria’s 
Former Finance Minister, Okonjo-Iweala claimed that most governors embark on foreign 
trips immediately after allocations from the Federal Government and yet cannot be 
arrested or prosecuted (Independent, 2006). 
 
The other problems of anti-corruption in Nigeria include perjury on the part of culprits 
and distortions in fact-finding by panels of inquiry, manipulation of information and 
records, and destruction of records or traces of corruption; and general lack of 
cooperation with the crusade either for lack of faith in it or because of the overwhelming 
culture of corruption across the nation. 
 
Impact of Corrupt Practices on Governance  
Corruption is the altar on which national development is slaughtered. The cost of 
corruption goes beyond the financial implications as revealed by the BBC. It has social, 
cultural and political drawbacks that have overall consequences on the development of 
the nation. The social, cultural and political backlashes have graver consequences for a 
nation’s existence. Let us examine some of these effects. 
 
Poverty and the Burden of Governance 
The immediate impact of stolen wealth is bankruptcy of a state. This creates a major 
problem of wealth creation and distribution as it also impedes job creation. The ultimate 
impact is mass unemployment and poverty of the majority. The burden of governance 
escalates as there are limited resources to carry out developmental projects or run 
government. 
 
Economic and Structural Underdevelopment 
The fewer the resources as a result of emptying treasury, the more the yawning gaps in 
structural development. Resources meant for multitude have been shared among a few. 
The result is economic backwardness and underdevopment. 
 
Inability to Control Other Kinds of Crime 
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Another structural problem corruption creates is that a corrupt government, institution or 
individual would not have the moral and legal justification or the boldness to control 
others or prosecute them. It thus leads to a situation of multiplication of corrupt practices 
that cannot be checked. 
 
Indebtedness to Other Nations  
The drained resources would require replenishment. The state could go a-borrowing 
again and again thus increasing indebtedness. This has manifested in the draining of 
Nigerian domestic and foreign reserves and the borrowing of more money from abroad. 
Nigeria’s external debt profile at March 31, 2013 is 6.6b USD, combining debts owed the 
World Bank, African Development Bank, Exim Bank of China, French Development 
Agency, among other agencies and bonds (DMO, 2013). 
 
Failure of institutions to work 
The fact that institutions and individuals are compromised would mean that the 
institutions will not be able to work or function and serve their purpose.  This will lead to 
a buffeted system and a perpetual state of disorder. There will surely be erosion of 
institutional capacity of government because of disregard for procedures and due process. 
Such lack of capacity owing to mismanagement of office and fund explains the failure of 
such institutions as the Nigeria Airways, NITEL, National Electric Power Authority 
(NEPA), commercial banks, among other groups.  
 
Poor Service and Productivity 
Again the compromised system engages personnel based on sentiments and not merits. 
As such, mediocrities are engaged, which have direct impact on quality of service 
delivery and output. The important issues here include nepotism and favouritism in 
public office and appointment and value distribution. The qualified personnel to execute 
excellent tasks are denied while incompetent friends, family members or those who have 
bribed to get the jobs are engaged, thus leading to poor service delivery. 
 
National Security Risks 
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Compromised security personnel can do little or nothing to protect lives and property. 
Where corruption has affected the health and food sectors, the citizens stand the risk of 
consumption of fake or adulterated drugs. In terms of national security, it has been 
reported severally that the Boko Haram security menace and other cases of armed gangs 
on rampage beating the security system have either been aided by bribed security 
personnel or have been able to beat a corruption-weakened security network (Abraham, 
2013). 
 
Other serious social and political consequences of corruption include compromising of 
the rule of law by the judiciary, unfair and inefficient provision of services of public 
administrators, undermining of the legitimacy of government and democratic values of 
trust and tolerance, and of course a consequent poor external image of the country. These 
are the situations Nigeria has been suffering for years as a result of festering corruption in 
the land.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the phenomenon of corruption in Nigeria, identifying the 
concept as it applies to the country; the causes, manifestations and implications for 
national development. The chapter also examined some cases of corrupt practices in high 
places and how these have affected governance and politics of Nigeria since 
independence. It did a historical search of corruption, establishing the fact that corruption 
in Nigeria dates back to the pre-colonial era of western incursions into Africa, and that 
the Post-Colonial State has degenerated more as a result of certain social factors, 
including poverty, greed, selfishness, and the likes.  
 
The strengths and weaknesses of the anti-corruption crusade were identified, with the 
devastating effects on nation-building highlighted. The dangerous consequences of 
corruption for the nation make it imperative that the anti-corruption war should be intense 
and backed by new and systematic strategies. Anti-corruption agencies should no longer 
be under the control of the Executive arm of government. They should be independent of 
political corruption. Such agencies should rather be controlled and answerable to the 
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judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, which is often independent of the Presidency 
or Executive. Also, the anti-corruption agencies should be made up of persons with 
records of integrity, who have never identified with any political party, and should be 
headed by a judge of the Supreme Court who has a track record of forthrightness and 
fearlessness 
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